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In the twenty-first century, the United States of America maintains the world's largest 
intelligence community. No other country has intelligence institutions that compare to its 
might and awesome powers. Some may argue its reach is ubiquitous at the international 
level. However, we must ask ourselves: how did the American intelligence community 
come into being, and how has it survived for so long? Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University 
of Edinburgh), who is a prolific academic writer on numerous subjects relating to 
American intelligence and national security, provides an explanation to these questions in 
his latest book entitled, Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence.  
At first view, the title of this book may cause people to think that it is about intelligence 
and economic espionage. In fact, Cloak and Dollar is a critical, yet supportive historical 
view of the American intelligence community. The central theme of this book is based on 
a problem Jeffreys-Jones defines as the confidence man, or what is known as 
hyperbole/exaggeration. Confidence man can be seen as a syndrome that has allowed 
intelligence agencies to receive both greater collection powers and funding over the 
years. Simultaneously, Jeffreys-Jones uses the idea of confidence man as an explanation 
of how American intelligence agencies are rewarded for their failures. It is believed that 
the "lack of openness encourages exaggeration," which leads to the continuation of 
confidence man. (p. 98) Furthermore, he links this issue with the intrigue and peril of 
creating and managing intelligence agencies. For Jeffreys-Jones, the confidence man 
syndrome is a "chronic disease," not a "fatal condition." (p. 10) 
The book is divided into 14 chapters and consists of 357 pages (including notes and 
index). Each chapter deals with the various intelligence agencies created by the American 
government, and major historical events that affected the country and intelligence 
agencies. Cloak and Dollar covers approximately 225 years of American history, 
beginning with George Washington and ending with the tragic events of 11 September 
2001. 
Jeffreys-Jones' use of historical analysis shines a light on key historical events. He 
explains that Allan Pinkerton's warning of a possible assassination plot against President 
Abraham Lincoln, "guaranteed him fame and fortune" for the future. (p. 30) In fact, 
Pinkerton provided intelligence reports that contained worse case scenario thinking, and 
exaggerated information "as much as threefold." (p. 24) Chapter five deals with the U-1, 
the first agency created during peacetime and operated for a short period (1915-27). 
Unlike other intelligence agencies U-1 was never penetrated by enemy infiltration. 
However, the demise of U-1 is the possible result of its failure in "public relations and 
hyperbole" (confidence man) unlike the Pinkerton Agency, and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) who were very successful at it. (p. 77) 
Other chapters focus on such issues as Pearl Harbor (1941), the creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Security Council 
(NSC) report 68, Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1975 Church Commission. 
This list is only a small fraction of issues Jeffreys-Jones discusses in Cloak and Dollar.  
The last chapter is devoted to issues that have arisen during the 1990s. Jeffreys-Jones 
reminds us that in the post-Cold War era there were many calls to abolish the CIA, and 
place its components inside the State Department. (p. 259) At the same time, outbreak of 
intelligence "turf wars" began between the FBI and CIA over foreign intelligence 
operations. (p. 261) In 1997, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet 
confirmed for the first time the intelligence community's budget as $26.6 billion. (p. 275) 
The chapter ends with the events of 11 September 2001. Jeffreys-Jones argues change is 
at hand "the situation was custom-made for the intelligence confidence man and his 
political allies. Once again, the cries were heard: give them more money; unleash the 
CIA." (288)  
What are the shortcomings of the Cloak and Dollar? The book fails to discuss several 
major recent events that have caused changes in both domestic and foreign intelligence 
operations, including the 1993 attempt at destroying the World Trade Organization; the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 American embassy bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya; and the 1998 Tomahawk missile attack in Sudan, where the CIA failed to provide 
accurate intelligence to the military. Jeffreys-Jones analysis of these events and their 
linkages to confidence men would have further enhanced the last chapter. These 
omissions are understandable since such discussion would have increased the size of the 
book over 500 pages.  
In conclusion, despite the shortcomings, Cloak and Dollar is an asset for any academic 
course on intelligence and national security. What differentiates this book from other is 
its central theme of "confidence man," and relating it to the development of American 
intelligence agencies. In the end, Cloak and Dollar not only enhances intelligence and 
national security studies, but also opens up a new area of research involving the 
confidence man syndrome.  
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